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Résumé 
 
Cette étude fournit des estimations de l’évolution des markups sectoriels au cours des trois dernières 
décennies. Elle conclut à une légère augmentation moyenne des marges prix-coûts, contrairement à 
ce que l’on attend généralement de l’accroissement de la concurrence. De manière plus frappante, 
elle met en exergue la convergence des markups dans les deux dimensions, pays et secteur. Ces 
évolutions expliquent en partie la baisse de la part du travail dans la valeur ajoutée. Lorsque l’on 
prend en compte les imperfections sur le marché du travail, elles suggèrent que le pouvoir de 
négociation des salariés a baissé et relèvent que l’endogénéité des structures de marchés, le partage 
de la rente et les interactions entre marchés de produits et marchés du travail sont des ingrédients 
essentiels pour évaluer l’impact d’un accroissement de la concurrence.  
 
Mots clés: Markup, Effet pro-concurrentiel, Négociation salariale, Part du travail dans la valeur ajoutée 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
This paper gives estimates of sectoral markup trends over the last three decades. It concludes with a 
slight increase of price-cost margins overall, contrary to the generally expected effect of increased 
competition. More strikingly, it establishes a clear pattern of markup convergence across countries and 
sectors. These movements explain a notable part of the decline in the labour share. Taking into 
account labour market imperfections, they suggest that the workers’ bargaining power has 
deteriorated and stress that endogeneous market structure, rent sharing and interactions between 
product and labour markets are key ingredients for assessing the impacts of increased competition.  
 
Keywords: Markup, Pro-competitive effect, Wage bargaining, Labour share 
JEL Classification: L11, L13, L60, J40, F02 
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1. Introduction 
In September 2004, Volkswagen had just started a negotiation with the largest German union, IG 
Metall, with the declared objective of reducing labour costs by 30%. In a press conference, the 
carmaker’s Director of Human Resources said: “Times have changed, we need new and creative 
solutions. […] We cannot isolate ourselves from the situation of worldwide competition”. 1  The current 
debate, particularly in France and Germany, about the extension of the working week, without 
proportional labour compensation, has brought the interactions between product market competition 
and the balance of power in the labour market to the forefront.  
 
The usual expected positive outcomes of increased competition in the goods markets refer to the 
stimulation of long-term productivity growth on the one hand, and to a lowering of distortions from 
imperfect competition, the so-called pro-competitive effect, on the other. At first sight, the stylised facts 
pointing to slowing productivity growth and more or less stable corporate profit ratios over the last 
thirty years in developed countries do not seem to accord with the intensified competition exemplified 
by the take-off of international trade flows. As the reciprocal dumping model of Brander and Krugman 
(1983) is a key theoretical block in establishing gains from trade due to the pro-competitive effect, 
wondering whether increased competition does reduce price-cost margins (PCMs) is an important 
question, especially as most of the studies finding some empirical support for the pro-competitive 
effect focus on developing countries.2 To my knowledge, Chen, Imbs and Scott (2004) is the only 
exception dealing with developed countries. Their results are much more convi ncing as regards the 
impact of international trade on productivity and inflation than on markups.     
 
From another perspective, Sutton (1991, 1997) insists on the endogeneity of market structure, which 
entails a non-monotonic relation between the intensity of competition and the concentration ratio of 
certain types of industries, working through the exit of firms unable to keep the pace. His bound 
approach articulates a mechanism that leads to a weakening or even a reversal of the pro-competitive 
effect. Also, but not necessarily related, the merger and acquisition wave of the ‘nineties gives an 
example of an endogenous reaction of firms aiming at improving their market power.  
                                                 
1 Quoted from the newspaper Les Echos, 08/24/04, my translation. 
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There is now an extensive literature recognising that wages are partly determined by rent-sharing 
between capital holders and workers. Since competition affects rents, it is of critical importance to 
account for labour market imperfections, especially as labour market institutions have evolved 
substantially. Rodrik (1997) promoted the idea that globalisation, taken here as a distinct aspect of 
deregulation, might have lowered workers’ bargaining power by increasing the substitution between 
domestic and foreign workers. Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003, hereafter BG) develop a general 
equilibrium model to capture the outcomes of product market and labour market deregulations. They 
use it to shed light on one of the most striking movements over the last decades, the decline in the 
labour share of value added within Continental Europe, which Blanchard (1997) emphasises forcefully. 
This decline apparently contradicts the pro-competitive effect. BG infer that the bargaining power of 
workers has most likely declined since the middle of the ‘eighties and show how product market 
deregulation may trigger labour market deregulation. Spector (2004) elaborates another formalisation 
highlighting the distribution conflict that product market deregulation generates, especially when rents 
are large and labour institutions are rather favourable to workers initially. On the empirical front, 
Oliveira Martins (1994) insists on market structure to infer the impact of international trade on wages. 
Moreover, Borjas and Ramey (1995) establish both the presence of significant rents captured by 
workers and the negative impact of imports on wages in concentrated sectors, especially those of 
lower educated workers, whereas Fontagné and Mirza (2001) also examine the positive effect of 
exports. Recently, Kramarz (2003) shows that outsourcing weakens the bargaining position of high-
school graduate workers by limiting their "threat point", i.e. the availability of alternative jobs, and 
therefore concludes that competitive pressures reduce their wages. 
 
This study provides estimates of structural markup trends over the last three decades at sectoral 
manufacturing level for thirteen OECD countries. It does not prove a causal link between the 
intensification of competition and the decline in the bargaining power of workers. However, it does 
establish that PCMs have not decreased overall. More precisely, it exhibits a strong pattern of markup 
convergence across both sectors and countries, and suggests an explanation through capital market 
integration. Moreover, it confirms BG’s presumption by giving indirect indications that workers’ 
                                                                                                                                                        
2 See, among others, Levinshon (1993) for Turkey, Harrison (1994) for the Ivory Coast, Krishna and Mitra (1998) for India and 
Roberts and Tybout (1996) for a survey. 
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bargaining power has diminished. Indeed, this decline enables us to reconcile, at the sectoral level, 
the expected theoretical impact of the pro-competitive effect, the slight increase in the PCM overall 
and the decrease in the labour share.    
 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 proposes a framework to measure structural markup 
changes and assesses whether assumptions regarding capital stock and user cost variables matter for 
the diagnosis. Results are then presented in Section 3. Section 4 focuses on labour market 
imperfections and on the implications of the exhibited trends for the labour share. Finally, Section 5 
gives some concluding remarks. 
 
 
2. Econometric specification 
In a methodological paper, Boulhol (2005) compares the usual markup estimates based on the primal 
Solow residual (Hall,1986) and on the price-based or dual Solow residual (Roeger,1995) with straight 
measures of the ratio of output to costs. One important finding stresses that the main question relates 
to the treatment of capital either as a variable or quasi-fixed factor, and that the data clearly leans 
towards the fixity assumption. Capital measurement issues are secondary. It is essential, at this point, 
to insist that the notion of markup we are interested in is not the tautological definition given by the 
ratio of output to total costs. Rather, it comes from first order conditions in profit maximisation and 
captures the idea of market power, i.e. the capacity firms have under imperfect competition to mark up 
variable costs in setting their prices at the desired level. If capital is fixed, at least in the short run, then 
costs related to capital will be fixed costs. They will impact overall profitability but will disappear from 
the markup equation.3 
 
 A second lesson is that, given the slow adjustment of capital, Roeger’s markups are overestimated to 
the extent that the returns to scale on the variable factors are decreasing, and are positively linked to 
long-term capital shares in total output. It is therefore preferable to start from the more general markup 
equation, 
    ).(. RKhQMWNPY ++= n                                                                                                            (1) 
                                                 
3 For more details, see Boulhol (2005). 
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where PY is output, WN labour costs, QM materials, RK capital costs, h takes the value of 0 or 1 
depending on the treatment of capital as a fixed or perfectly adjusting factor respectively, and to see 
whether our results differ in these two extreme cases, the real world lying somewhere in between. n  
stands for the markup to marginal cost m , adjusted for the returns to scale on the variable factors x : 
x/mn º   . Keep in mind that the prime goal of this study is to assess the markup trends  over the last 
thirty years and not to estimate the markup levels precisely. Indeed, it may well be that, even though 
markup levels are sensitive to how capital is treated, markup changes  are not. Moreover, insofar as 
economies of scale are constant, relative changes in adjusted markups n  equal relative changes in 
markups over marginal cost m . 
 
The markup of interest to us is the structural markup. It is structural in the sense that it depends on 
structural parameters like the level of concentration in the industry, the intensity of competition, the 
demand elasticities. Observed markup may be impacted by transitory shocks and influenced by such 
economic events as price developments and cycles and therefore, the specification should control for 
these effects. A price shock will impact markups if there are rigidities, in the sense that prices are slow 
to adjust to changes in nominal marginal costs. At the macroeconomic level, for the period under 
study, the oil price shocks have had major impacts on observed markups resulting in distortions of 
value-added sharing between factor shares and profits. Among numerous reasons are: unexpected 
price developments, wage indexation, price stickiness, adjustment costs, terms of trade effects. It is 
well known that for continental Europe, especially France and Italy, wage indexation during the two oil 
price shocks resulted in an increased labour share and a squeezing of corporate profits and markups.4 
In order to control for price developments, the change in the GDP deflator, DEFL, is included in the 
regressors. In addition, in order to account for the oil crises specifically, two centered-variables are 
built: OIL1 is the (log of the) price of WTI barrel (source OECD Economic Outlook) expressed in local 
currency and deflated by GDP prices; OIL2 is the share of oil consumption in total GDP (constructed 
                                                 
4 However, in a study focused on US sectors and based on a VAR model, Rotemberg and Woodford (1996) asses that an 
increase in markups during the oil shocks is the most consistent scenario explaining both the magnitude of the decline in output 
and the decrease in real wages they observe. They have on mind a representation where markups are endogeneous and 
"propose that oil price increases lead to increases  in desired markups". In their case, the markup desired after a temporary 
shock differs from the steady -state markup. 
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from the number of barrels consumed, source OPEP) times the change in real oil prices over the last 
five years. The main justification for using OIL2 lies in the decreased dependency of energy 
consumption on oil over the last two decades.  
 
Because of its importance in the drawing up of macroeconomic policies, an abundant literature deals 
with the cyclicality of markups but whether markups are pro- or contra-cyclical remains unresolved. 
Obviously, the cyclicality relates to the observed markups. It is mostly due to mismeasurement of 
factor services but does not concern the true or desired markups which depend on structural 
parameters only. The cycle impact is controlled for, at sector and country levels, by the introduction of 
two variables. At sector level, following Bils (1987), the annual change in employment is used for the 
cycle variable, and EMPCYC is the de-trended series using a Hodrik-Prescott filter. At the country 
level, the output gap, GAP, from the OECD 2003 Economic Outlook, is used. 
 
Finally, the logarithm of the structural markup tn , is represented by a polynomial of time. The order of 
the polynomial was limited to two ex post, as greater numbers did not impact the estimates 
significantly. Due to data limitations, constraints had to be imposed: the macroeconomic variable 
(DEFL, OIL1, OIL2 and GAP) effects were pooled across sectors for a given country, and thus the 
estimation is run at the country level. Therefore, the full specification is the following, where i indices 
country, j sector and t time: 
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where all RHS variables are taken as their respective difference to a reference point 19800 =t and the 
structural markup is given by:   2000 ).().()()( ttcttbLogLog ijijijijt -+-+= nn . 
 
Data for this study is from the OECD STAN database and is described in the Appendix. Note that the 
averages across sectors presented in the following tables are unweighted, i.e. treating each equally, 
because our prime interest lies in the mechanisms at work rather than in the impact for the total 
economy.   
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3. Results 
The results presented below correspond to the case of quasi-fixity of capital (h = 0) and sub-section 
3.5 returns to the question of the sensitivity to capital treatment. In order to summarise the results, 
changes through time are often represented between two reference points, one common to all time 
series, 1980, the other being the last available point, 2000, except for Canada and Sweden, 1996, and 
the UK, 1998. Residual analysis indicates the need to correct for auto-correlation at the second order.5 
 
3.1. Variance analysis 
A crude variance analysis of the dependant variable in equation (2) on country, sector and time fixed 
effects reveals that the explained variance (45%) comes mostly from the sector dimension, accounting 
for 48% of it, then the country, with 41%, and finally time, with the remaining 11%. The prevalence of 
sector is not surprising given that markups are mostly determined by market structures, which should 
be similar for a given sector across OECD countries, but may vary substantially across sectors. The 
heterogeneity in the country space likely reflects differences in goods and labour market regulations. 
Finally, the analysis of the 11% time share is the main focus of this study. 
 
3.2. Prices 
Table 1 shows that price changes and observed markups are estimated to be negatively linked: an 
increase in inflationary pressures induces a reduction of (observed) markups.6 This is consistent with 
price stickiness forcing firms to cut their margins in the face of unfavourable cost developments. 
However, the variable DEFL is significant for only 4 of the 13 countries at the 5% level, which may be 
due to the correlation with oil price variables over the period. When it is significant, it implies that a 
decrease of 10 points in the GDP deflator, not uncommon since 1980, leads to a 1%-2% increase in 
observed markups. Moreover, the two oil price variables are jointly very significant. Oil price changes 
between 1980 and the end period entail, beyond the DEFL impact, an average increase of 0.7% in 
observed markups for all countries, ranging from -0.6% for the UK - the only negative point - to 3.8% 
                                                 
5 Estimates are produced from an AR(2) process for the residuals, the correlation parameters being specific to the (country x 
sector) couple. Although it corrects for auto-correlation successfully, a more general treatment would have consisted in an error 
correction model, which allows to distinguish the short term from the long term dynamics.  
6 Blanchard (1997) finds the same relation, although according to his footnote 41, the introduction of lags of adjustment of factor 
proportions leads to a weaker relation. 
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for Japan, very dependent on oil. Overall, price effects generated an increase in observed markups 
from 1980 for all countries and of 1.3% on average. 
 
3.3. Cycles 
At the sectoral level, although the estimates are weakly significant, they confirm the counter-cyclicality 
of markups, of which Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) provide some possible explanations, including 
overhead labour, adjustment costs and labour hoarding. Counter-cyclicality is supported empirically by 
Bils (1987) and Oliveira Martins and Scarpetta (2002) among others. Over the 132 sectors, the 
parameter EMPn  is negative in 92 cases, being significant at 10% level in only 32 sectors against 16 
when positive. On average per country (Table 1), the effect of EMPCYC is counter-cyclical for 10 
countries, pro-cyclical for 2 only and neutral in the case of the USA. Overall, a cycle materialising in an 
increase of 1% above trend in sectoral employment induces a decrease of 0.07% in the markups.  
 
The estimated impact of the macroeconomic cycle, through the GAP variable, is more robust and 
clearly leans towards the pro-cyclicality of markups. This may be due to some externality in demand 
and is consistent with the observed pro-cyclicality of accounting profits. From the latter observation, 
scepticism about the counter-cyclicality of markups is implied in Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans 
(1996). On balance, these estimates may provide an explanation for why the debate concerning the 
cyclicality of markups remains unresolved. There may be a supply-driven counter-cyclical partial 
equilibrium effect dampened by a pro-cyclical general equilibrium one. Table 1 indicates that, on 
average across countries, an increase in the output gap of 1 point of GDP results in an average 
increase in sectoral markups of 0.20%. Note that, although the average sensitivity is three times larger 
than the EMPCYC one, employment at the sectoral level could fluctuate much more than the output 
gap at the country level. 
 
3.4. Structural markups 
Once controlled for price and cycle effects, one can focus on the structural markup changes. First, 
changes through time are significant: the assumption that there is no structural markup change over 
the period is rejected for 82 of the 132 sectors at the 1% confidence level and for 93 of them at 5%.7 
                                                 
7 Wald test on b and c parameters of equation (2). 
 9 
Second, the general result points to a slight average increase of 1.4% from 1980, the details of which 
are given in Table2. This means that on average, given the last row of Table1 for the price and cycle 
effects, the observed markups increased by 2.4%, 1.4% being structural.8 Among all the sectors, 76 
post a markup increase from 1980. The average of the increase is 5.5%, whereas for the 56 remaining 
sectors, the decrease averages -3.5%. All countries but Italy, Japan and Norway experience an 
increase on average. Sweden, starting from rather low markups in 1980, posts the greatest increases 
in all sectors but one.  
 
This general picture is, to a large extent, surprising. Indeed, the widespread perception is certainly one 
which deems that competition has become fiercer over the last three decades, due to trade 
liberalisation and to extended domestic enforcement of competition rules. Numerous country case 
studies, focusing mostly on developing countries, identify that trade liberalisation has had a pro-
competitive effect, reducing the distortions from imperfect competition. However, and more 
consistently with the results above, in an extensive analysis of the trends in the industrial 
concentration at sectoral level in the European Union between 1987 and 1997, Davies (2001,  
Table5.1.2 p.38) concludes that concentration increases slightly on average. 9  
 
Moreover, as most trade is intra-industry, the reference model establishing gains from trade remains 
the reciprocal dumping model of Brander and Krugman (1983). From their theoretical predictions, the 
pro-competitive effect is expected to reduce the markups and to increase both the real wages and the 
labour share. This increase in the labour share in OECD countries has been the missing piece in the 
trade-induced pro-competitive effect puzzle. Although disentangling the impacts of the determinants of 
structural markups is beyond the scope of this study, the first important result - no global decrease of 
markups - suggests that the reciprocal dumping model is probably not an adequate framework to 
                                                 
8 If we measure the average structural change taking as the reference point the first available data for each sector instead of 
1980, the increase is 4.2% instead of 1.4%, signalling a noticeable structural increase in the ‘seventies. 
9 When concentration ratios are weighted by sector size, there is a slight decrease in average concentration (Table 5.1.1). In 
either case, given the level of market power estimated here, the overall impact of concentration changes on markup changes 
would be less than one percent, based on a proportional relation between elasticity and the inverse of Herfindahl index. Note 
however that the notions are not strictly comparable since Davies measures the concentration at the EU level. For instance in 
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assess gains from trade. Moreover, in focusing on markups, the potential benefits of increased 
competition through increased long-term productivity growth are not analysed here. Therefore, if an 
economist wants to analyse the outcome of increased competition, she or he should rather take into 
account firm heterogeneity and a Darwinian-type effect generating the exit of the least efficient firms, 
which are probably also the least profitable. 10  
 
Result 1:  Structural markup changes over the last 25 years are mostly significant. On average, 
markups over marginal cost went up 1.4% from 1980. More sectors see their markups increasing, and 
those increasing change more in absolute terms than those decreasing.  
 
The second result may be the most striking and highlights some form of markup convergence within 
countries. On the one hand, high markups tended to go down over time, which is consistent with 
Oliveira Martins, Scarpetta and Pilat (1996), who use the same database between 1970 and 1992 and 
with Borjas and Ramey (1995) who study the impact of imports on rents in US concentrated industries. 
On the other hand, and even more predominantly, low markups tended to go up. The combination 
results in a robust markup convergence which I now illustrate in different ways. 
 
 First, Table3 gives the Pearson correlation between the relative change of the estimated structural 
markup since 1980 and the estimated level in 1980 across sectors for each country. This correlation is 
negative for twelve of the thirteen countries in the sample. It equals -0.60 on average and is very 
significant for six countries.  
 
Second, one can directly turn to the data. For illustration purposes, charts 1a to 1c graph the observed 
markup trends in the case of France. In each of these charts, the convergence is clearly visible, with  
an increase in low margin, a decrease in high margin sectors and a lower dispersion of markups over 
                                                                                                                                                        
the reciprocal-dumping world, markups and local concentration fall with market integration even though global concentration 
does not change or even might increase with exit of firms. 
10 Another possibility is that exports, targeted at high margin markets, may have driven an increase in markups, which 
compensates the potential decrease due to deregulations. 
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time.11 Obviously, these are just descriptive statistics and I now attempt to provide three 
complementary explanations. 
 
First and foremost, the trimming of the highest markups fits well within the classical pro-competitive 
story. Increased competition, through facilitation of new entry or international trade for instance, lowers 
concentration and induces an increase in the perceived elasticity of demand faced by firms, triggering 
a fall in desired markups. In the case of identical firms as an example, any new entry leads to a 
percentage drop of the markup which is all the greater in absolute term that the initial markup is high. 
 
Second, through the lower bound approach, Sutton (1991, 1997) insists on the non-monotonic relation 
between the intensity of competition and the concentration of activity. When market structure is 
endogeneised, especially when competition operates not only through prices but also through R&D 
and advertising, more competitive pressure generates the scaling up of expenditures which leaves 
less profitable firms in operation. Their exit may entail a rise in average markup. Moreover, 
concentration also increases when firms react to the increased competitive environment through 
mergers or acquisitions. It may well be that the sectors with the lowest markups in 1980 were subject 
to such intense competition that the implied low level of concentration “could not” be maintained. We 
can also think of sectors like textile and wearing apparel (17-19), which does not exhibit decreased 
markups despite the acknowledged intensified competition from developing countries, restoring 
profitability thanks to the levelling off of product quality. This is consistent with what is observed in 
chart 1a in the case of France. However, I was unable to link the markup changes to the sectoral 
typology developed by Davies et al (1996), based on whether competition operates through price 
and/or advertising and/or R&D. Part of this failure probably comes from the high level of aggregation in 
the samples which does not allow for a clear differentiation of the sectors. However, even at the 
disaggregated level, Davies (2001, p.43) reaches a similar conclusion as regards concentration: 
“While our typologies […] continue to have some success in explaining inter-industry differences in the 
level of concentration, it does not appear that they have much explanatory power concerning changes 
in market concentration”. Most interestingly, Davies also highlights the convergence of concentration 
ratios across sectors (Table 5.1.5).  
                                                 
11 From these charts, we can suspect that the removal of price-control in France in the middle of the eighties’ have mattered. 
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Finally, one cause favouring markup convergence is the improved efficiency of financial markets. Let 
me outline this idea. Following an arbitrage argument, an investor will choose the sector providing her 
or him with the best return. For a given sector, the gross rate of return r  is: 
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Ka being the capital share of output. If financial markets are efficient, the excess return variable 
KahR /)/11(/ nrp -+=º  should be equal for every sector: in other words, the assumption of 
equalised returns across sectors implies that the (adjusted) Lerner index should be proportional to the 
capital share of output.12 This does not mean that (adjusted) markups over marginal cost should be 
equal in every sector, but this creates a strong convergence constraint. To better understand it, using 
data for the USA as an example, under the assumption that capital costs should be treated as fixed 
(variable respectively) costs and using average capital shares for each sector, the average excess 
return p  equals 1.7 (1.9 resp.). If excess returns were equal to this average in each sector - the 
stylised assumption of capital market efficiency - we could infer the markup level for each sector, 
based on the same capital shares, from )].(1/[1 , ha jKj --= pn . This computation puts forward that in 
this case, although average markup would barely change, the dispersion of markups would fall by 
slightly less (slightly more resp.) than 50%.13 In other words, although these calculations are 
admittedly rough, they clearly point to the link between capital market efficiency and markup 
convergence across sectors. The channel is of course the capital mobility from low profit sectors to 
high profit ones. These three explanations combined help in understanding why markups may have 
not decreased on average (and even increased slightly) despite a perceived feeling of increased 
competition. 
 
Result 2: There is a strong convergence of markups through time across sectors within countries. 
Three complementary explanations are proposed: increased competition materialises on the one 
hand, by lower concentration in high profit industries, on the other, by higher concentration in low profit 
                                                 
12 Implicitly, we bluntly ignore the sectoral heterogeneity in terms of risk and depreciation rate of capital. 
13 Allowing capital shares to vary with markups leads to the same conclusion in the Cobb-Douglas case. 
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ones due to the endogenous reaction of firms; improved financial market efficiency balances the return 
on capital across sectors. 
 
The markup convergence also appears clearly within sectors across countries. Table 4 shows that, 
although structural markups increased in 7 out of the 11 sectors from 1980, the dispersion across 
countries decreased in 8 sectors. The causes seem fairly straightforward. To the extent that OECD 
countries are similar, economic integration entails a convergence of markup determinants at the 
sectoral level. Call it globalisation, the increased international trade flows and international capital 
mobility induce a convergence of markups within sectors.  
 
Result 3: At sectoral levels, structural markups are converging across countries. International 
economic integration is very likely to be the main driver. 
 
Adding the sector and country dimensions, these results indicate a global convergence of markups, as 
chart 2, a graphic representation of the last row of Table 3,  tells compellingly. The last row of Table 4 
indicates that the dispersion of markups decreased by more than 20 percent between 1980 and 2000. 
Moreover, regressing the log-difference of estimated structural markups between the end period and 
1980 on the 1980 markup and on country and sector fixed effects for the 132 sectors yields a 
parameter for the initial (1980) markup of -0.72, being very significant (Student of -11.3). It is as if we 
could write a conditional convergence equation: 
       ijijtijT LogLogLog mkmkm .)1( +-=  
with 72.0=k , T = t + 20 years and ijm being the long term markup of which the estimate is read from 
the fixed effects. To make the analogy with growth theory, there are both b -convergence 
)10( << k and s - convergence.  
 
3.5. Capital sensitivty 
In the case of quasi-fixity, the average increase in structural markup might reflect an endogenous 
increase to restore profitability in the face of higher real interest rates which weigh on fixed costs. 
However, when capital is treated as a perfectly adjusting factor, the slight increase in markups on 
average is attenuated somewhat but results pointing at various types of convergence are maintained. 
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These conclusions are also robust to different computations of capital variables. In other words, 
although markup levels depend on the specification, markup changes are not really sensitive to this 
choice. This suggests that capital changes are not large enough to have an impact on estimated 
markup changes, which is not too surprising given the fairly low capital shares in total output. 
Moreover, when focusing on the sample with less aggregated sectors, the main results remain.  
 
 
4. Implications for the labour share 
 
4.1. Labour share sensitivity to markup 
A priori, the greater the markup, the lower the labour share of value added, Ls . However, the 
sensitivity depends on the parameters of the production function and should therefore be measured at 
sectoral level. For a given sector j, based on the estimated structural markups, the following panel 
specification is tested: 
ittiititL ueeLogs +++= mq .,                                                                                                             (3) 
where ie  and te  are country- and time-fixed effects respectively, controlling for relative factor prices, 
disinflation and potentially biased technical change in particular. One should not read more into 
equation (3) than an accounting relationship. Table 5 gives the estimates which are very significant. 
For all sectors on average, a 1% increase in structural markups leads to a decrease in the labour 
share of 1.7 points, ranging from 1.1 to 2.4 points depending on the sector. Therefore, the overall 
increase in the structural markups highlighted above partly account for the reduction in the 
manufacturing labour share, of 4.1 points of value added on average across countries, experienced by 
the thirteen OECD countries over the last three decades.14 
 
 From 1980, as shown in Table 6 for the ten countries for which data for all the sectors is complete, the 
manufacturing labour share decreased by 9.7 points of value added on average across countries, of 
which within-sector changes represent 9.3 points. Based on the estimates of equation (3) and sector 
weights, the changes in structural markups explain a decrease of 2.8 points. Blanchard (1997) 
                                                 
14 From the STAN database, the manufacturing labour share of value added has declined since 1970 in all thirteen countries 
except Japan (+19 points), Norway (+3 points) and Austria (flat).  
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estimated that changes in the labour share for the total economy were almost exclusively due to 
biased technical change and not to markup changes. The main limitations in his approach come from 
constraining the production function to the Cobb-Douglas case and from focusing at the country level 
only. In addition, even he expresses some doubts about these results.15 Those presented in Table 6 
for manufacturing hopefully shed some light on this question. 
 
4.2. Price-cost margin, markup and bargaining power 
Up to this point, firms were assumed to be wage-takers. I would now like to introduce wage bargaining 
and investigate one avenue aiming at reconciling the expected classical link between increased 
competition and markups - i.e. a negative relationship - with the above results underlining an overall 
joint increase in PCMs and decrease in labour shares. With g  being the bargaining power of workers 
and uW  the reservation wage, the objective function being maximised in the Nash-bargaining process 
is classically gg ]).[()]([ 1 NWWRKQMWNPY u-++-
- . Under the right-to-manage model, firms continue 
to choose employment based on a given wage, be it negotiated, and real wage remains allocative: first 
order conditions and all the previously used relations are left unchanged.  
 
Under the efficient bargaining model however, both wages and labour are bargained over 
simultaneously. This creates a wedge between markups and PCMs. At this stage, an additional 
notation is necessary. m  is still the markup over marginal cost, but the true adjusted markup, 
x/mn º , differs, due to workers’ rents, from the PCM which is the (adjusted) markup over the average 
cost of the variable factors, now denoted n  and still defined by equation (1). Indeed, the labour first-
order condition becomes: 
         NYNYPW /)./11.(/)/(/ ngm -+¶¶=  
which states that the wedge between real wages and the marginal product of labour depends not only 
on product market imperfections but also on the rents captured by workers based on their bargaining 
power. Using Euler's equation and the other first-order conditions lead to:  
         ).(
)1.(1
QMRKWNPY ++
-+
=
ng
n
 
                                                 
15 “The great variation in the coefficient across countries […] makes me uneasy about the results”, pp 137-138. 
 16 
This implies that the PCM, n , which was estimated in Section 3, is in fact equal to )]1.(1/[ -+ ngn . 
This relationship can be expressed more conveniently in terms of the Lerner index: 
LL ).1()/11).(1()/11(
)1.(1
gngn
ng
n
n -=Û--=-Û
-+
=                                               (4) 
(when capital is fixed, one obtains: LaL K )..1/()1( gg --= ) 
One can easily interpret equation (4). The Lerner index derived from the data, L , is seen from the 
point of view of the firm paying the wage W which includes the rents kept by workers . L  refers 
therefore to the share kept by the firm and equals the true Lerner index, L , times )1( g- . The 
straightforward implication is that when labour market imperfections are ignored, as is the case in most 
markup estimates, the degree of product market imperfection, as represented by markup over 
marginal cost, is under-estimated, and even more so the greater the bargaining power. Innovatively, 
Crépon, Desplatz and Mairesse (2002) extend Hall’s approach to estimate markups and bargaining 
power on a panel of French firms. They come to a significant and stronger value than that found in 
other studies for g  of around 0.6, leading them to reject the right-to-manage model in favour of the 
efficient bargaining version.16 Next, it appears immediately from (4) that, when we wrongly omit labour 
market imperfections, the then estimated PCM, n , can rise even if the true structural markup , n , is 
under downward pressure, provided that the bargaining power has been eroded sufficiently. Actually, 
deriving (4) entails: 
         
L
L
L
L D-D=
-
D
g
g
1
                                                                                                                      (5) 
such that, if the true markup decreases, as one expects "classically" as a results of increased 
competition ( 0<DL ), whereas the PCM increases ( 0>DL ) as we highlighted above, workers must 
have been losing some bargaining power.  
 
As for the labour share, to get an idea of the magnitude involved, consider the Cobb-Douglas case: 
         cba MNKAY .=  
The labour share of value added is then: 
                                                 
16 The authors calculate the average markup in the panel but their specification implies that the deviation from this average for a 
given firm can be treated as a residual, which bothers me, at least because sectoral determinants of markups are likely 
correlated with their RHS variables.    
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 -  i) perfect labour market or right-to-manage:                   )/( cbsL -= m           
-   ii) efficient bargaining and capital adjusting perfectly:    )/()].([ cxbsL --+= mmg      
-   iii) efficient bargaining and quasi-fixed capital:               )/()].1/()1).(.([ caaxbs KKL ----+= mgmg  
 
Deriving the labour share with respect to the markup and the bargaining power yields: 
-  i) mm D--=D )./( css LL     
- ii) gmmmmg D--+D---=D )./()()./()( cxcss LL   
- iii) ggmmmmgg D----+D-----=D .).1/()1).(/()()./()].1/()1.([ 2KKKKLL aacxcaass  
With 1,06.1,7.0,7.0 ==== xcsL m ,
17 one gets in the first case, mD-=D 9.1Ls  which is consistent with 
estimates of equation (3) found in Table 5. In the second case, with 3.0=g , gm D+D-=D .18.0.1.1Ls . 
Because workers keep part of the rents, the labour share is less sensitive to markup changes. In 
addition, it is not very sensitive to g : a loss of 10 points in the bargaining power reduces the labour 
share by 1.8 points only, so that the decline in the labour share would most likely be the joint effect of 
an increase in (true) markup and a decrease in the workers weight. Finally, for the third case, one has 
to be careful about consistency in setting parameter value: with 06.0=Ka and 11.1=n , 
7.0,7.0 == csL  are consistent with 16.1=n  and still 06.1=m  (hence 90.0/ =+== cbxnm ). These 
values imply that the output is shared according to 70.0,20.0,06.0 === MLK aaa , the remaining 04.0  
being profits. In this case where capital is quasi-fixed, the labour share evolves according to 
gm D+D-=D .41.0.2.1Ls  and is more sensitive to bargaining power changes. A fall in the bargaining 
power could be the main driver of the decline in the labour share, and even, if large enough, may 
offset a possible decrease in true structural markups.    
 
Result 4: The observed slight increase in price-cost margins is closely related to the decline in the 
labour share with a sensitivity estimated between 1.5 and 2. When accounting for labour market 
imperfections, the decrease in the bargaining power of workers might explain both the increase in 
estimated price-cost margins, which differ in this case from markups over marginal cost, and the 
decrease in the labour share. In particular, if true markups over marginal cost have gone down 
                                                 
17 This calibration is consistent with data for the USA presented in the table 1 of Boulhol (2005). 
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following intensified competitive pressure, bargaining power must have fallen to be consistent with the 
observations. 
 
  
5. Concluding remarks 
The general impact of economic integration and perceived fiercer competition might be found in the 
labour market. Indeed, the overall effect on the product markets does not fit in with the textbook 
version of a straightforward decrease in market power: there has been no common  trend in structural 
price-cost margins at manufacturing sectoral level over the last decades and a slight average 
increase. More specifically, the results highlight a clear pattern of markup convergence across both 
sectors and countries, potentially channelling through increased financial market efficiency and capital 
mobility. In other words, this means that high margins have shrunk and low margins bounced.  
 
Since it is difficult to dismiss the perception of more intense competition, these results imply that the 
decline, if any, in true market power is more than counterbalanced by a decrease in the workers’ 
bargaining power, which erodes the labour share in value added. This has important implications for 
economic modelling and especially for the assessment of welfare gains from increased competition. In 
particular, the reciprocal dumping model is misleading since increased competition seems to have 
more consequences for rent-sharing between shareholders and workers than for the producer / 
consumer trade-off. In terms of welfare then, to the extent that consumers are also workers, the net 
effect is ambiguous. Boulhol (2003) showed that the most beneficial theoretical impact from the pro-
competitive effect, for a government having some aversion for inequality, was actually the 
redistribution from shareholders to consumers: in the data used, this mechanism does not materialise. 
Consequently, theoretical models focusing on the outcomes of increased competition should at least 
include three ingredients: endogenous market structure, rent-sharing and interactions between 
product and labour market. 
 
Obviously, it is tempting to infer from the joint increase in competition and decrease in bargaining 
power, as the weakening of unions symbolises, a causal link. BG propose that intensified competition 
diminishes the workers’ willingness to bargain as there are lower rents to struggle for. This argument is 
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not really convincing because it applies to the employers’ bargaining power reciprocally.18 Let me 
suggest another possibility. In recent years, pressure has mounted from investors to require a high 
rate of return on equity. If this requirement acts as an effective constraint, this entails that the observed 
markup n  will be tied up at a relatively high level. Therefore, increased competition would be passed 
on to workers. Equation (5) gives the implied bargaining power changes necessary to maintain the 
price-cost margin constant for a given change in true market power. Under this scenario, based on 
reasonable values of parameters, 3.015.1 == gn , a one percent fall in true markup would generate a 
five point drop in the bargaining power. In this light, equation (5) could be read as linking the workers’ 
bargaining power, to the firm market power and the “financial market power”.  
 
Finally, there are at least three directions worth pursuing to strengthen the results presented in this 
study. First and foremost, working with more disaggregated data will refine the estimates since the 
two-digit level mixes industries heterogeneous in terms of market power. Second, a specification 
identifying the workers’ bargaining power directly would enable us to disentangle the markup from the 
bargaining power changes. Finally, trying to link the markup trends to those in its structural 
determinants further could enrich the analysis dramatically. These determinants mainly include market 
structure characteristics (R&D, firm size, competition type), product and labour market regulation and 
international features. 
 
 
Appendix: Data description 
Sectoral data come from the OECD Structural Analysis (STAN) Database. Table A1 details the 23 
manufacturing sectors. Two samples have been built covering thirteen OECD countries’ manufacturing 
industries at the two-digit level for the period 1970-2000, using International Standard Industrial 
Classification (ISIC), third revision. One has more detailed information but is sparse, as some sectors 
are missing for a number of countries, and is composed of 138 time series (a country-sector crossing). 
The other contains more aggregated data but is more balanced with 132 annual time series available 
out of a total of 143. 
 
                                                 
18 Unless the bargaining costs are asymetrical as BG suppose. 
 20 
The variables are PROD, Production (Gross Output) at current prices ( YP.  in the text), LABR, Labour 
compensation of employees ( NW . in the text), VALU, Value added at current prices and for Materials, 
VALUPRODMQ -=. . 
Capital : The price of capital, kp , used in the study is the price of investment calculated from the 
Gross Fixed Capital Formation at current prices (GFCF) and in volume (GFCFK). When data is not 
available, the price of the GDP deflator (source OECD Economic Outlook) is chosen for kp . The user 
cost of capital is calculated classically according to: ).( akk pdrpR &-+=  , where r is the interest rate, d 
the depreciation rate and akp&  is the ex pected relative change in the price of capital. By default, r was 
chosen as the long-term interest rate (but an alternative with short-term rate was also tested), the 
depreciation was fixed at 0.05 (but 0.07 was also tested) and akp&  was set at the average of the price 
change over the last three years. I also tested as r, the average of the short -term and the long-term 
rates, and even a constant for the real interest rate. 
 
Net capital stock (NCAPK) is available directly in the data for Belgium and Italy only. For the other 
countries, I calculated the series based on the Gross Fixed Capital Formation in volume (GFCFK) 
according to: ttt GFCFKKdK +-= -1).1( . Only, the starting point value for the net capital stock is 
missing to build the series. It was derived differently depending on the countries, due to data 
availability. For Austria, Finland, Japan, Norway and the USA, I used the Consumption of Fixed 
Capital (CFC) and inferred: dCFCKp k /. 000 =  for the first date. For Canada, France, the UK, the 
Netherlands and Sweden, I computed qc ... 000 VALUKp k = . c  is the average, for each sector over 
time and over countries for which the gross capital stock (CAPK) is available, of VALUCAPKp k /.  and 
is reported in TableA2. The parameter q  reflects the ratio of net capital stock to gross capital stock. I 
ran simulations based on various methodologies (double-decline, geometric, hyperbolic, see OECD, 
2001) and reasonable values of parameters to arrive at a ratio of between 0.50 and 0.85. I chose 
70.0=q  by default, but compared the results with 55.0=q . Finally, as Denmark provides gross capital 
stock only, I used the constant ratio q  to deduce net capital stock for all dates. 
For more details on other series of capital services based on Gross Capital Stock, on the Consumption 
of Fixed Capital and on various depreciation rates, see Boulhol (2005).
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Table 1: Price and cycle effects on observed markups from 1980 to 2000 (a) 
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  PRICE CYCLE 
country 
Number 
of  
sectors 
DEFL 
Effect 
 
OIL 
 Effect (b) 
 
Total  
Price 
Effect 
EMP
in (c) 
GAP
in  
EMPCYC 
Effect (c) 
GAP 
Effect 
Total 
Cycle 
Effect (c) 
  
Parameter Estimate x 
Change in Variable 
DEFL + 
OIL 
effects  Parameter Estimate  
Parameter Estimate x 
Change in Variable 
EMPCYC 
+ GAP 
Effects 
aut 11 -0.2% 0.8%*** 0.6% -0.08 0.03 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
bel 9 -0.3% 0.4%*** 0.1% -0.20 0.16** -0.4% -0.1% -0.6% 
can 11 1.9%*** 0.4%** 2.3% 0.16 0.06 -0.2% -0.2% -0.4% 
dnk 11 1.1%** 0.3% 1.4% -0.02 0.09 -0.2% 0.2% 0.0% 
fin 11 -0.7% 0.7%** 0.0% -0.14 0.09 -0.4% -0.1% -0.5% 
fra 11 0.4% 0.7%*** 1.1% -0.13 0.16* -0.1% 0.0% -0.1% 
gbr 11 1.8%*** -0.6%*** 1.1% -0.09 0.43*** 0.1% 1.5% 1.6% 
ita 11 2.1%** 0.1% 2.2% -0.15 0.46*** 0.5% -1.8% -1.3% 
jpn 6 0.4% 3.8%*** 4.1% -0.10 0.21 -0.3% -0.4% -0.8% 
nld 11 0.2% 1.4%*** 1.5% 0.05 0.29*** 0.1% 0.6% 0.7% 
nor 11 -0.7%* 1.4%*** 0.7% -0.08 0.02 0.2% 0.0% 0.2% 
swe 7 0.9% 0.0% 0.8% -0.16 0.63*** -0.5% -2.3% -2.8% 
usa 11 0.4% 0.8%*** 1.2% 0.00 0.02 -0.5% 0.1% -0.4% 
 132         
mean  0.6% 0.7% 1.3% -0.07 0.20 -0.1% -0.1% -0.25% 
 
 (a): 1996 for Canada and Sweden, 1998 for the UK. The observation period starts as early as 1970 when data is available  
 (b) Significativity is based on the joint significance of the two oil parameters.    
 (c): average across sectors: )( EMPij
j
EMP
i Mean nn =  
  (*):Significativity at 10%, (**) at 5%, (***) at 1% 
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Table 2: Structural markup changes between 1980 and 2000 (Equation 2, h = 0) 
 
 Austria Belgium Canada Denmark Finland 
sector Struct. 
Mkup 
1980n  
Relative 
Change 
1
1980
2000 -
n
n
 
Struct. 
Mkup 
1980n  
Relative 
Change 
1
1980
2000 -
n
n
 
Struct. 
Mkup 
1980n  
Relative 
Change 
1
1980
2000 -
n
n
 
Struct. 
Mkup 
1980n  
Relative 
Change 
1
1980
2000 -
n
n
 
Struct. 
Mkup 
1980n  
Relative 
Change 
1
1980
2000 -
n
n
 
15-16 1.121 6% 1.113 0% 1.108 6% 1.079 -1% 1.094 0% 
17-19 1.111 1% 1.037 6% 1.088 2% 1.112 -2% 1.121 3% 
20 1.233 -6% 1.111 -2% 1.056 5% 1.128 -1% 1.100 1% 
21-22 1.129 7% 1.117 3% 1.140 1% 1.081 5% 1.132 8% 
23-25 1.098 13% 1.113 4% 1.073 8% 1.105 10% 1.177 -1% 
26 1.178 4% 1.117 5% 1.167 -1% 1.135 2% 1.216 -2% 
27-28 1.119 4% 1.060 3% 1.078 -1% 1.084 6% 1.115 2% 
29 1.081 6% . . 1.127 0% 1.082 2% 1.159 -6% 
30-33 1.081 6% . . 1.142 -7% 1.087 5% 1.166 7% 
34-35 1.093 2% 1.040 0% 1.056 3% 1.034 -2% 1.087 0% 
36-37 1.092 7% 1.090 1% 1.094 5% 1.142 -5% 1.212 -9% 
mean  4.6%  2.1%  1.8%  1.8%  0.4% 
           
 France UK Italy Japan   
15-16 1.150 -1% 1.087 4% 1.146 0% 1.144 -11%   
17-19 1.045 7% 1.098 0% 1.197 -4% . .   
20 1.120 3% 1.115 2% 1.285 -1% . .   
21-22 1.150 -2% 1.075 5% 1.183 0% . .   
23-25 1.158 0% 1.119 -1% 1.123 5% 1.168 6%   
26 1.078 12% 1.120 0% 1.280 -7% . .   
27-28 1.103 3% 1.049 4% 1.187 -2% 1.138 -1%   
29 1.169 -5% 1.135 2% 1.218 -8% 1.150 -7%   
30-33 1.211 -9% 1.194 -3% 1.225 -9% 1.162 -7%   
34-35 1.022 7% 1.016 4% 1.111 -3% 1.120 -8%   
36-37 1.238 -5% 1.096 6% 1.228 -4% . .   
mean  0.9%  1.9%  -2.9%  -4.8%   
           
 Netherlands Norway  Sweden USA All countries 
15-16 1.085 4% 1.059 -1% 1.012 13% 1.070 4%   
17-19 1.129 -4% 1.088 0% 0.971 16% 1.065 0%   
20 1.019 8% 1.098 -4% . . 1.178 -5%   
21-22 1.110 5% 1.093 2% 1.079 11% 1.123 0%   
23-25 1.128 1% 1.104 3% 1.086 15% 1.097 10%   
26 1.188 0% 1.161 -1% 1.051 13% 1.078 8%   
27-28 1.096 -1% 1.123 -3% 1.080 9% 1.078 4%   
29 1.064 2% 1.124 -3% . . 1.081 -3%   
30-33 1.107 -3% 1.143 -3% . . 1.092 6%   
34-35 0.976 6% 1.029 1% 1.133 -1% 1.039 4%   
36-37 1.152 -7% 1.133 -9% . . 1.105 4%   
mean  0.9%  -1.5%  11.0%  3.0%  1.4% 
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Table 3: Markup convergence across sectors 
 
country 
Pearson correlation 
between 
1980/2000)/( nnD  
and 1980n  
aut -0.67** 
bel -0.23 
can -0.59** 
dnk -0.16 
fin -0.41 
fra -0.87*** 
gbr -0.74*** 
ita -0.52* 
jpn 0.49 
nld -0.72*** 
nor -0.40 
swe -0.82*** 
usa -0.45 
total -0.60*** 
 
                                                              (*):significativity at 10%, (**) at 5%, (***) at 1% 
 
 
Table 4: Convergence within sectors across countries 
 
 Structural markup average Structural markup standard deviation 
sector 1980 2000 Change 1980 2000 Change 
15-16 1.097 1.116 + 0.039 0.044 + 
17-19 1.089 1.110 + 0.056 0.029 - 
20 1.131 1.131 <>0 0.075 0.056 - 
21-22 1.118 1.157 + 0.032 0.036 + 
23-25 1.119 1.177 + 0.032 0.041 + 
26 1.148 1.176 + 0.065 0.030 - 
27-28 1.101 1.121 + 0.037 0.033 - 
29 1.125 1.109 - 0.047 0.030 - 
30-33 1.144 1.132 - 0.050 0.045 - 
34-35 1.058 1.069 + 0.047 0.033 - 
36-37 1.144 1.129 - 0.058 0.045 - 
mean 1.116 1.130 0.014 0.049 0.038 -0.011 
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Table 5: Labour share sensitivity to markup 
ittiititL ueeLogs +++= nq .,     
sector q  Std Error Nb obs Adj RSquare 
15-16 -2.45 0.10 393 0.88 
17-19 -2.04 0.12 364 0.88 
20 -1.63 0.15 336 0.76 
21-22 -1.01 0.12 364 0.77 
23-25 -1.67 0.12 391 0.78 
26 -1.62 0.09 361 0.84 
27-28 -1.35 0.22 391 0.80 
29 -1.27 0.18 271 0.77 
30-33 -1.72 0.15 271 0.85 
34-35 -2.32 0.16 391 0.78 
36-37 -1.35 0.09 336 0.85 
mean -1.67    
 
Table 6: Contribution of structural markup changes 
 to manufacturing labour share changes 
 Manufacturing labour 
share changes from 
1980 
(% value added) 
Within-sectors 
changes  
 
(% value added)* 
Structural markup 
contribution 
 
(% value added)** 
aut -14.5 -15.9 -8.7 
can -11.3 -12.1 -4.5 
dnk -8.9 -7.0 -3.6 
fin -11.3 -4.5 -2.4 
fra -9.4 -9.4 -0.8 
gbr -10.1 -9.8 -2.9 
ita -2.2 -2.1 4.5 
nld -14.5 -13.7 -2.1 
nor -3.4 -2.9 1.2 
usa -11.6*** -15.6 -8.6 
mean -9.7 -9.3 -2.8 
 
(*) Here is the within/between decomposition, with j being sector, t  time and jk  sector j  share in manufacturing value added. 
å=
j
tjLtjtL ss ,,,, .k Þ BetweenWithin
ss
ssss jL
j
TjLtjL
jL
j
Tjtj
tLTLL +=D
+
+D
+
=-=D åå ,,
,,,
,
,,
,, .2
.
2
k
kk
 
(**) )/.(.
2
,,
jjj
j
Tjtj mmq
kk
D
+
å ,  jq  coming from equation (3) and Table 5, )/( jj mmD  from Table 2. 
(***) Although the US labour share in total value added did not change much from 1980, the manufacturing labour share 
decreased sharply over the period. Almost three quarters of this drop comes from the ‘Motor Vehicules’ and ‘Chemicals’ sectors. 
This is consistent with Borjas and Ramey (1995) who find a strong impact of international trade in the automobile industry 
because rents were high originally. 
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Table A1: ISIC Rev. 3 Classification 
 
Sector desrciption 
  
More aggregated sample  
 
15 FOOD PRODUCTS AND BEVERAGES 15-16 
FOOD PRODUCTS, BEVERAGES AND 
TOBACCO 
16 TOBACCO PRODUCTS 17-19 
TEXTILES, TEXTILE PRODUCTS, LEATHER AND 
FOOTWEAR 
17 TEXTILES 20 WOOD AND PRODUCTS OF WOOD AND CORK 
18 
 
WEARING APPAREL, DRESSING, DYING OF FUR 21-22 
PULP, PAPER, PAPER PRODUCTS, PRINTING 
AND PUBLISHING 
19 
LEATHER, LEATHER PRODUCTS AND 
FOOTWEAR 23-25 
CHEMICAL, RUBBER, PLASTICS AND FUEL 
PRODUCTS 
20 WOOD AND PRODUCTS OF WOOD AND CORK 26 OTHER NON-METALLIC MINERAL PRODUCTS 
21 PULP, PAPER AND PAPER PRODUCTS 27-28 
BASIC METALS AND FABRICATED METAL 
PRODUCTS 
22 PRINTING AND PUBLISHING 29 MACHINERY AND EQUIPMENT, N.E.C. 
23 
COKE, REFINED PETROLEUM PRODUCTS AND 
NUCLEAR FUEL 30-33 ELECTRICAL AND OPTICAL EQUIPMENT 
24  CHEMICALS AND CHEMICAL PRODUCTS 34-35 TRANSPORT EQUIPMENT 
25 RUBBER AND PLASTICS PRODUCTS 36-37 MANUFACTURING NEC; RECYCLING 
26 OTHER NON-METALLIC MINERAL PRODUCTS 
  
27 BASIC METALS 
  
28 
FABRICATED METAL PRODUCTS, except 
machinery and equipment 
  
29 MACHINERY AND EQUIPMENT, N.E.C. 
  
30 
OFFICE, ACCOUNTING AND COMPUTING 
MACHINERY  
  
31 
ELECTRICAL MACHINERY AND APPARATUS, 
NEC 
  
32 
RADIO, TELEVISION AND COMMUNICATION 
EQUIPMENT 
  
33 
MEDICAL, PRECISION AND OPTICAL 
INSTRUMENTS 
  
34 
MOTOR VEHICLES, TRAILERS AND SEMI-
TRAILERS 
  
35 OTHER TRANSPORT EQUIPMENT 
  
36 MANUFACTURING NEC 
  
37 RECYCLING 
  
 
 
Table A2: Computation of initial capital stock for each sector: 
Average over time and countries (Belgium, Canada, Finland, France and Italy) of  
VALUCAPKp k /.  
sector c  
15-16 2.75 
17-19 2.07 
20 3.91 
21-22 2.89 
23-25 3.31 
26 3.15 
27-28 3.14 
29 1.52 
30-33 1.52 
34-35 2.39 
36-37 2.55 
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Chart 1A
France: Convergence in observed markups
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Chart 1B
France: Convergence in onbserved markups
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Chart 1C
France: Convergence in observed markups
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Chart 2
Convergence in structural markups 
-10%
-5%
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
0.95 1.05 1.15 1.25 1.35
Initial structural markup (1980)
C
h
an
g
e 
in
 s
tr
u
cu
tr
al
 
m
ar
ku
p
 (
20
00
/1
98
0)
 
 
 
 
